Service¯rms have been increasingly competing for market share on the basis of delivery-time.
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Motivation and Integrative Framework
Firms have been increasingly competing on the basis of response, delivery, or shipping time.
Many¯rms now choose to announce a guarantee on their maximal service delivery-time in order to entice customers. For example, several cable TV companies (e.g., Time Warner Cable) guarantee that they will be on time for installation otherwise their installation is free. Similarly, many product¯rms (e.g., Tradewinds Co®ee) waive their shipping charges if they do not deliver their products on time. Some banks (e.g., IndyMac Bank) even o®er handsome rebates on mortgage closing costs if they fail to respond to loan applications within hours. The conventional wisdom is that such commitment can provide a powerful source of competitive advantage if the service guarantee represents a breakthrough in service and the¯rm is able to ful¯ll the guarantee at high reliability.
How does a¯rm choose a delivery-time commitment that will have the most signi¯cant marketing impact and what factors determine this choice? In selecting a delivery-time commitment, the¯rm must consider not only how customers will react to the commitment but also whether it has adequate service capacity (e.g., level of sta±ng) to ful¯ll the commitment with high reliability. A tight delivery-time commitment has both bene¯ts and costs. It can attract impatient customers, but the performance of a congested system might deteriorate unless service capacity is expanded accordingly. Depending on the inherent random nature of the customer arrival and service delivery processes, an excessive capacity may be required to ful¯ll the tight service guarantee. Thus, the choice of a delivery-time commitment requires careful consideration of both marketing (i.e., customer) and operations (i.e., capacity) related factors. This paper presents an integrative framework that allows the analysis of the above fundamental tradeo®. We consider a service¯rm who is interested in maximizing its demand rate (which is equivalent to its market share when the total demand rate for the industry is held xed). While the¯rm's demand rate is potentially a®ected by other service attributes, we focus on the impact of the service delivery-time and assume that customers would be attracted by a low expected maximal delivery-time and a high delivery quality. Here the delivery quality is restricted in the time dimension. We de¯ne the delivery quality as conformance of customer's perceived delivery-time to expected delivery-time. More precisely, the delivery quality is the probability that the perceived delivery-time is shorter than the expected maximal delivery-time.
While the customer's expected delivery-time can be in°uenced by other factors such as price, word-of-mouth, communications controlled by the company, and prior service experiences (Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman, 1991), we naturally assume that an announced commitment sets customer expected delivery-time (Hart, 1988) . Larson (1991) has observed that the perceived delivery-time can be in°uenced by many psychological and social factors. It is, however, reasonable to assume that the perceived delivery-time is positively related to the actual deliverytime which is determined by both the demand rate and the level of capacity. A high demand rate increases the degree of congestion and thus lengthens the perceived delivery-time. The integrative framework is illustrated by an in°uence diagram as shown in Figure 1 .
This integrative framework builds on models and concepts from the marketing and operations literature. The basic building block of the above integrative framework is the well-known gap model of service quality developed in the marketing literature (Anderson, 1973; Oliver, 1977; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, 1985; Boulding, Staelin, Kalra, and Zeithmal, 1994 ).
The gap model suggests that if a customer expects a certain level of service, and perceives the service received to be higher, she will be a satis¯ed customer. This stream of literature points to the importance of managing customer expectation and perception for improving service quality.
In addition, it is empirically shown that purchase intention (and hence demand rate) increases as service quality improves (Boulding, Staelin, Kalra, and Zeithmal, 1994) . We contribute to this literature in three ways:
² Our de¯nition of delivery quality captures the impact of process variability on quality explicitly, a critical dimension that is often ignored in the previous literature.
² We model the impact of congestion explicitly by incorporating the in°uence of the demand rate on the perceived delivery-time.
² Service capacity is considered explicitly so that the ability of the¯rm to meet the expected delivery-time can be investigated.
Delivery-time in a congested system is the central topic of the vast queuing theory literature (for comprehensive reviews see, for example, Kleinrock, 1975; Cooper, 1990) , which provides us with a good understanding of service system performance for various customer arrival and service processes. Typical system performance measures of interest include server (manpower or facility) utilization, queue length, and delivery time. The latter is further classi¯ed into the so-called delay (which is the waiting time in queue before entering service) and total waiting time (i.e., sum of the delay and service time). The level of capacity is usually modeled by the system con¯guration (e.g. number of servers and the service time distribution). Our model framework employs the well-understood relationships between delivery-time and demand rate as well as level of capacity developed in this body of literature. Our framework di®ers from the traditional queuing literature in the following ways: ² Customer's expectation on delivery-time is explicitly considered in the analysis of the system. ² Delivery quality, which is also the level of customer satisfaction, is used to measure system performance. Average queue length and waiting time have impact on delivery quality but they are not equivalent to it 2 .
² The demand rate here is endogenous rather than exogenous.
Based on the integrative framework, we develop a normative model to study the impact of a delivery-time commitment. A simple graphical representation is used throughout in our model analysis, which begins with the establishment of demand rate equilibrium. When congestion e®ect is negligible (in systems with ample capacity), we obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal delivery-time commitment. Under congestion, we derive optimality conditions for the delivery-time commitment and use them to design an algorithm for computing the optimal 2 The traditional queuing literature has not always paid attention to the human aspect of the service encounter.
One important exception is Hall (1991) We consider a¯rm that serves a population of homogenous customers who are impatient and sensitive to service delivery-time 3 . The¯rm's objective is to maximize its demand rate, which is a®ected by customers' expectation for the delivery-time as well as the probability that this expectation is being ful¯lled. Let the service delivery-time be denoted by t, which is a random variable because customer arrival and the service processes are inherently random. Let T be the customers' expected maximal delivery-time. We de¯ne Q = Prob(t · T), which is the probability that a service delivery meets the customers' expectation, as the delivery quality.
Ceteris paribus, a customer is more likely to use the service if it has a tighter delivery-time commitment and a higher delivery quality.
Here we assume that the customer population is homogenous. The delivery quality, as dened above, is equivalent to the fraction of satis¯ed customers 4 . In the context of managing service¯rms for customer satisfaction, we believe that this de¯nition of quality seems more relevant than the commonly used system performance measures such as average waiting time 3 In some service contexts, customer may actually prefer delay (Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995) , possibly enjoying the anticipation of the event.
4 A more re¯ned model may capture the extent of delay experienced by customer. Our model basically assumes that customer satisfaction is a binary variable: Customer is happy i® the¯rm meets its promised delivery-time.
and queue length. We also note that the above de¯nition of quality can be easily extended to other service attributes.
The delivery-time depends on the demand rate and service capacity. Fix the¯rm's process capacity. Let¸be the¯rm's demand rate and F(s;¸) be the probability distribution function of the delivery-time. Thus,
We model the congestion e®ect by assuming that F (s;¸) is decreasing (nonincreasing) in¸.
The service system is referred to as uncongested system if F is independent of¸.
For a given demand rate¸, F(¢;¸) is the distribution function (cdf) of delivery time, which is readily available either in exact closed-form expressions or in good approximations for F for actual delivery-times for various classes of customer arrival and service delivery processes.
Depending on the application, the delivery-time can be referred to as either the waiting time in queue or the total system time (the waiting time + the service time). In bank teller and telephone ordering/enquiry services, the waiting time in queue is more relevant. For these applications, the classic M=M=c queuing system is an appropriate model. Let ¹ be the service rate of a server and a =1 . The waiting time distribution can be expressed as follows (Kleinrock, 1975 ):
where
is the probability that an incoming customer has to wait. In many repair, mailing, and fast food delivery services, however, customers are interested in the total system time. In this case, we model the whole service delivery process as an M=M=1 queuing system in our analysis for simplicity. The distribution of the total system time of the M=M=1 system is:
3)
It has been observed that the perceived delivery time may not be the same as the actual delivery time. Katz, Larson, and Larson (1991) showed empirically that customers visiting bank tellers tended to over-estimate the amount of time they spent waiting in line and that the di®erence between perceived and actual waiting times is approximately normal with a mean overestimation of one minute and a standard deviation of 2.5 minutes.
We assume that a delivery-time commitment will narrow the gap between perceived and actual waiting times because customers will become more conscious about the actual time and may monitor it more closely as a result of the¯rm's service commitment. It remains, however, an empirical question as to how delivery-time commitment will impact the gap between perceived and actual delivery times. In our numerical examples, we use the actual delivery-time distribution function. In particular, we will use (2.2) and (2.3) as the delivery time distribution of service systems that can be represented by M/M/c systems and M/M/1 systems respectively.
Demand Rate Equilibrium
We model the¯rm's demand rate by the following general formulation. Note that ¤ is assumed to be¯xed, and S 2 (0; 1) may be any continuous, increasing function.
The customer's utility for the¯rm's service depends on the expected delivery-time and service quality:
where¯0;¯T ; and¯Q are nonnegative constants.¯T and¯Q re°ect customer sensitivity to the delivery-time expectation and to the service quality, respectively, and¯0 summarizes her utility for all the¯rm's other attributes. The model says that the¯rm's market share is decreasing in the delivery-time expectation and increasing in the service quality. We note, in general,¯Q could also depend on T . If more impatient consumers care more about delivery quality, then we have¯Q =¯Q(T) being decreasing in T .
A distinction has recently been made between two types of expectations: 1) the will expectation (i.e., a level which is expected to occur), and 2) the should expectation (i.e., a level which ought to happen) (Tse and Wilton, 1988 and Boulding, Staelin, Kalra, and Zeithmal, 1994). These researchers show empirically that the higher the customers will expectation and the lower their should expectation of the service, the more satis¯ed they are likely to¯nd the service. A slightly more general version of our model can capture this distinction. If we rewrite
, the customer's utility is increasing in will expectation (as higher will expectation is indicated by a lower T W ) and decreasing in should expectation (i.e. higher T S ) 5 . In this paper, we implicitly assume that announcement of a delivery-time commitment will close the gap between the will (T W ) and the should (T S ) expectations so that Lee and Cohen, 1985, Cooper, 1993) . Here, the market share of¯rm i, S i , in an industry with m¯rms is given by:
where U j is the customer's utility for¯rm j's service. In Section 3, we concentrate on analyzing a passive competitive environment and assume that the customer's utility for other¯rms' services are not signi¯cantly a®ected by the¯rm's decision. In the multi-logit model, this implies that 5 Boulding, Staelin, Kalra, and Zeithmal (1994) indicate that ideally one would want to simultaneously increase customers will expectation and decrease their should expectation. They suggest that such activity seems impossible. In our model, delivery-time commitment is a marketing activity that will increase both the customers will and should expectations.
the¯rm's market share is given by (dropping the subscript i):
where A = P j6 =i e U j . In Section 4, we explore how the customer's utilities for di®erent¯rms interact with each other in an duopolistic market.
For notational convenience, let Á(T;¸) = ¤S[U(T; F(T;¸))]. Equation (2.4) becomes:
We note that, due to the congestion e®ect, customers' utility is decreasing (nonincreasing) iņ for a given T , and so is Á(T;¸): Since the demand rate is endogenous and appears in both sides of equation (2.8), the existence of equilibrium, which is the solution of (2.8), must be established¯rst. For convenience, we intuitively refer to Á(T;¸) as`tomorrow's demand rate'
given todays' demand rate¸. A market equilibrium is reached when tomorrow's demand rate is the same as todays'.
Proposition 1 For any given T , there exists a unique¸(T) 2 [0; ¤] that satis¯es (2.8).
Proof: Since Á(T; 0) > 0, Á(T; ¤) < ¤, and Á is continuous in¸, Á(T;¸) ¡¸= 0 has a solutioņ (T ) due to the mean-value theorem. The uniqueness follows from the fact that Á(T;¸) ¡¸is strictly decreasing in¸(because Á(T;¸) is decreasing in¸).
In Figure 2 , we let the horizontal axis represent today's demand rate and the vertical tomorrow's. Then, for a given T, the Á function is represented by a continuous curve that has a negative slope (because of the congestion e®ect). The equilibrium demand rate is the intersection of the Á curve and the 45 degree straight line. For a given T, the slope of the Á curve provides a measure for the degree of congestion: A higher slope (in absolute value) indicates a more congested system. A horizontal line indicates an uncongested system (or a system with ample capacity) since tomorrow's demand rate is not a®ected by today's demand rate.
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Maximization of Demand Rate
We consider the following optimization problem:
Let T ¤ be the optimal delivery-time commitment, and¸¤ be the maximum demand rate thē rm can obtain by making a proper choice of T; that is,
Next, we show that T ¤ can be identi¯ed e±ciently.
Uncongested Systems
We say a system is uncongested if an incoming customer never needs to wait. Such a system may be modeled nicely as an M=G=1 queuing system with an in¯nite number of servers and an arbitrary service time distribution. For an uncongested service system, the delivery-time is of course referred to as the service time for each individual customer, which is independent of the demand rate. Let G(T) be the distribution function of the service time, we have F(T;¸) = G(T).
Since in this case the right hand side of (2.8) is independent of¸, and the S-function is increasing, the optimal time commitment T ¤ also maximizes U . Let g(¢) be the density function of the delivery time. Note that @U(T;¸)=@T = ¡¯T +¯Qg(T ), which is decreasing in the range of T where g(T) is decreasing. Here we make further assumption that the relevant range of T is the range where g(T ) is decreasing. Within this range, g(T ¤ ) =¯T Q is a necessary and su±cient condition because then
For most well-behaved probability distributions, the density function g(t) declines for the range of t when G(t) is close to 1 (say, 0:8). This assumption is plausible because a delivery-time commitment makes sense only if the service quality is high enough. For example, our assumption means that the quality of the commitment must be at least 50% if g is of normal density. Under these assumptions and for appropriate¯T and¯Q, we may write:
Thus, the choice of a delivery-time commitment requires a proper understanding of both customer attitudes and service delivery process. The form of the optimal time commitment suggests that only the tail-distribution of the service delivery process matters. This result should not be surprising because the`tail' region is where the¯rm does not ful¯ll its service commitment. Consequently, a fat-tail process must be accompanied by a looser commitment.
Thus a competitive marketing strategy that is based on a tight delivery-time commitment must be matched by a¯rst-class service process that has a thin tail.
The optimal time commitment should be tighter if the customers are highly impatient (high T ). This may explain why many service¯rms are pushing for a tight delivery-time commitment. However, as indicated in (3.2), this is just one of the three factors that determine the level of service commitment. The level of commitment is also a®ected by the customers' sensitivity to service quality. A looser commitment should be adopted if the customers are very conscious about service quality. Failing to meet customers' expectation in a service delivery can hurt the¯rm's future market share. Indeed, we suspect that many service¯rms`over-commit' and ignore the rami¯cations of failing to keep a service guarantee.
In an uncongested system, the optimal level of time commitment is not a function of the competitive attraction level A. This is so because the assumed ample capacity decouples thē rm from its environment. We shall show, in Section 3.2, that this is not true in a congested system. This suggests that if a particular¯rm in an industry has ample capacity (acquired through perhaps a new technology), it needs only to ensure that its service guarantee matches with the speed of the service process and may ignore the level of service of the competitors.
Example 1. Exponential service time g(t)
= ¹e ¡¹t where ¹ is the mean service rate.
Note that T ¤ > 0 only if ¹ >¯T Q . Note that T ¤ is convex in ¹ for positive T ¤ . Also note that @T ¤ =@¹ < 0 for ¹¯Q=¯T < e or the delivery quality is below 1 ¡ e ¡¹T ¤ > 1 ¡ e ¡1 = 63:2%.
Under the high delivery quality assumption, a faster service process should be accompanied by a tighter delivery time commitment.
Example 2. Normal service time g(t) =
where m and ¾ are mean and variance of the service time.
The expression is valid only for ¾ <¯Q p 
Congested Systems
For general congested systems, maximizing the demand rate is more involved. Let f (t;¸) be the density function of the delivery time. The necessary optimality condition is characterized by the following pair of equations:
Besides¯Q;¯T ; and the tail-distribution f , T ¤ is also a function of the total demand rate ¤ and the competitive attraction level A (since it depends on the Á function). In general, there is no closed-form solution for T ¤ . We propose a procedure to compute T ¤ below.
Lemma 1 For any given T 0 , let¸0 =¸(T 0 ), let T 1 = argmax T Á(T;¸0) and let¸1 =¸(T 1 ).
We have¸1¸¸0. Similar to the assumption made in the uncongested system, we assume that T ¤ is always at the declining tail of the density function of the actual delivery time, i.e. T ¤ 2 ft : g(t;¸¤) is decreasingg. We further assume that for any pair of¸i; i = 1; 2 with¸2 >¸1, if g(t;¸2) is decreasing in t 2 [a; b], so is g(t;¸1). Under these assumptions, the algorithm is rather e±cient because it follows the similar logic as in section 2.1 that in step 2, T 1 is the inverse function of f(¢;¸). For a given density function such as the exponential or the normal, T 1 can be solved by a closed-form expression.
Using the above algorithm, we conduct an extensive numerical simulation. We observe that a larger A will result in a smaller¸¤, other things being equal. If the process has an exponential tail and a high enough service level is assumed, T ¤ will be tighter for a higher competitive attraction level A. The total demand rate (¤) has an opposite e®ect. It will lead to a higher¸¤ and a looser time commitment. The parameters¯T and¯Q a®ect T ¤ in the ways similar to those in uncongested systems.
Service Delivery Capacity
In this subsection, we study how the¯rm's optimal market share depends upon the¯rm's capacity. Assume that the¯rm's capacity level can be characterized by a variable C. In this subsection, we denote the delivery time probability distribution function by F(T;¸; C).
Naturally, F is assumed to be increasing in C. We also augment all of the other notation by adding the argument C. For example,¸(T; C) would be the demand rate satis¯ng (1) for given T and C,¸¤(C) the maximum demand rate achievable for given C.
Proposition 3¸¤(C) is increasing in C.
Proof: For any C 0 and C with C 0 > C, we show¸¤(C 0 )¸¸¤(C):
Proposition 4 suggests that the optimal market share is increasing in capacity. A stronger result that we have been unable to prove but will be very useful is that the optimal market share is concave in C. In this case, the capacity planning problem (max C¸¤ (C)) will reduce to solving the¯rst-order condition. An extensive numberical analysis shows that under reasonable parameter values the optimal market share is a concave function of C.
Competitive Interactions
In this section, we consider a duopolistic setting in which two¯rms compete for a¯xed market.
Throughout this section, we assume the logit model for market share function. For each¯rm, the model framework studied in Sections 1 and 2 remains valid with one exception: the e®ect of one¯rm's decision on the other can no longer be ignored. This is because one¯rm's gain must be the other's loss when the total demand rate of the market is¯xed.
We add subscript i(i = 1; 2) to all the notation to represent¯rm i's. Let T and¸be the vectors of fT 1 ; T 2 g and f¸1;¸2g respectively. Then, for any given T, the market equilibrium is reached under the following conditions:
Note that we allow the sensitivity parameter¯0 to be di®erent between the two¯rms to re°ect the di®erences in their other service attributes, but assume that¯T and¯Q are the same.
For¯xed T, since ¤ =¸1 +¸2, Á i can be viewed as a function of¸i only. Due to symmetry, we may further focus on analyzing one¯rm, say,¯rm 1. The market equilibrium equation for rm 1 (the¯rst equation of (4.1) ) can be written aş
where ¹ Á(T;¸1)´Á 1 (T; f¸1;¸2g) = Á 1 (T; f¸1; ¤ ¡¸1g). It follows from (4.4) and the congestion e®ect that ¹ Á is continuous and decreasing in¸1. Therefore, as before, we know that there exists a unique market equilibrium¸1(T) that satis¯es (4.1) and (4.2).
We note that ¹ Á decreases faster than Á in Section 2. To see this, we compare (4.3) with (2.7). The di®erence is that while previously A is assumed to be a constant independent of¸, e U 2 in (4.3) is an increasing function of¸1. In words, in the duopolistic competition, when¯rm 1's demand rate increases,¯rm 2's must decrease by the same amount. Due to the congestion e®ect,¯rm 1's delivery quality deteriorates and¯rm 2's improves. In turn, customers' utility of¯rm 1's service decreases and that of¯rm 2's increases. Both of these changes contribute to the decrease of¯rm 1's tomorrow's demand rate, see (4.3) . Thus, the bene¯ts of a tight delivery-time commitment is less than that without competitive interaction. This is an important point. Even if¯rm 2 does not respond to¯rm 1's move to a tighter time commitment, rm 2's delivery quality will improve as a result of less congestion. This challenges the wisdom that a drop in delivery-time will lead to a quantum leap in market share.
Next, we address the question of whether a Nash equilibrium exists in this duopolistic competition. A set of time commitments is in equilibrium if, given time commitments of other¯rms, a¯rm cannot increase its own market share by choosing a time commitment other than the equilibrium time commitment. To show its existence, it su±ces to show that¸1(T) =¸1(fT 1 ; T 2 g) is unimodal in T 1 for any given T 2 (i.e.,¸1(T) is quasi-concave in T 1 given T 2 ). Fix T 2 . Focus on¯rm 1 so that we may drop the subscript 1 whenever this would not cause confusion. Let 1 (T )´¸1(fT; T 2 g). It is geometrically clear (see Figure 3 ) that in order to show the unimodality of 1 (T), it su±ces to show that for any
and ¹ Á(fT a ; T 2 g;¸) cross at most once; and (iii) Á(fT c ; T 2 g;¸) and Á(fT b ; T 2 g;¸) do not cross before Á(fT b ; T 2 g;¸) and Á(fT a ; T 2 g;¸) do.
f Insert Figure 3 g Since for¯xed¸, U 2 is the same for ¹ Á's with di®erent T 1 values, and since ¹ Á is strictly increasing in U 1 , it su±ces to show the above properties (i){ (iii) for U 1 instead of ¹ Á.
Proposition 4 Nash equilibrium exists if the service processes of the two¯rms in the duopolistic competition are M=M=1 systems and the delivery time of interest is the total system time.
Proof:
1. When¸' 0, the delivery quality is F (T; 0) = 1 ¡ e ¡¹T (see equation 2.3), and U (T; 0) = also know when the delivery quality is su±ciently high, the optimal time commitment is decreasing in the service rate. For any positive¸, U(T;¸) =¯0 ¡¯T T +¯Q(1¡e ¡(¹¡¸)T ), which can be viewed as the utility function of the uncongested system with an e®ective service rate1 = ¹ ¡¸(< ¹). Therefore, the¯rm's choice of time commitment must be larger than T o . So, we may restrict our discussion within the range of fT : T > T o g without loss of rigor. Clearly, U(T; 0) is decreasing in T.
We show that for any
is monotonely increasing in the relevant range of¸, which in turn implies that U(T a ;¸) and U (T b ;¸) cross at most once.
Since
it reduces to show that Te ¡(¹¡¸)T is decreasing in T . Di®erentiating it with respect to T, we have @(Te ¡(¹¡¸)T )=@T = e ¡(¹¡¸)T ¡ T(¹ ¡¸)e ¡(¹¡¸)T . It is negative when T (¹¡¸) > 1, or the delivery quality is higher than 63.2%. Therefore, we have shown that U (T a ;¸) and U(T b ;¸) cross at most once in the range of¸where the delivery quality is higher than 63.2%. 
We need to show that U(T c ;¸a b ) < U(T b ;¸a b ) and U(T a ;¸b c ) < U (T b ;¸b c ). The¯rst inequality is true since
and F(T;¸) is (exponentially) concave in T . Similarly, U(T a ;¸b c ) < U(T b ;¸b c ) because
Thus, 1 (T ) is unimodal, and the proposition is proven.
For¯rms with M=M=c service systems and the queuing time being of interest, it is easy to show that (i) and (iii) holds: (i) is true because when¸' 0, the service quality F(T; 0) = 1 (a customer hardly needs to wait). Therefore, U(T; 0) =¯0¡¯T T, and it is obvious that U (T; 0) is decreasing in T ; (iii) holds because the waiting time distribution is also exponential and hence concave in T. For general M=M=c case, we have not been able to prove analytically that (ii)
holds. We conjecture this on the basis of numerical examples. We prove this for the special case of M=M=1 with queuing time.
Proposition 5 Nash equilibrium exists if the service processes of the¯rms in the duopolistic competition are M=M=1 systems and the delivery time of interest is the waiting time in queue.
Proof:
The service quality of the M=M=1 system (in waiting time) is F(T;¸) = 1¡1 e ¡(¹¡¸)T .
As before, we needs to show that @F=@¸is an increasing function of T . Since
where the¯rst term is clearly increasing in T , and the second has been shown (in the proof of the previous proposition) to be increasing in the range of (¹ ¡¸)T > 1. For¸in the range of (¹ ¡¸)T < 1 and F(T;¸) is high, we need to show that
which holds true for ¹¸2¸. Note, however, that for (¹ ¡¸)T > 1, the service quality
The service level would be lower than 1 ¡ (1=2)e ¡1 ' :82, which is not relevant in today's service environment. while both¯rms will experience a lower payo® for investing in additional service capacity, the resulting levels of delivery quality experienced by the customers will be higher.
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Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we have presented a simple model for studying how a¯rm should set its deliverytime guarantee in managing service delivery. The model integrates the gap model of service quality from marketing with the classical queuing models from operations. We obtain a closedform solution for the optimal delivery-time commitment when the¯rm has an ample capacity.
Under congestion, we characterize the optimal delivery-time commitment with a set of conditions and use it to design a computational scheme. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria in a duopolistic game and show that the delivery-time game is similar to a Prisoners' Dilemma when the cost of adding capacity is small.
The model allows us to study several marketing-operations interface issues. 
